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Abstract—Networks-on-chips (NoC) are emerging as a prom-
ising interconnect solution for eﬃcient Multi-Processors Systems-
on-Chips. We propose a methodology that supports the spe-
cification of parametric NoCs. We provide suﬃcient constraints
that ensure deadlock-free routing, functional correctness, and
liveness of the design. To illustrate our method, we discharge
these constraints for a parametric NoC inspired by the HERMES
architecture.
I. Introduction
Multi-Processors Systems-on-Chip (MPSoC) designs integ-
rate several processing and memory cores on a single die. To
gain performance the trend is to increase the number of cores
and parallelism [1]. To manage the complexity of modern
MPSoCs, a popular approach is platform based design [2]. A
new MPSoC is built by assembling pre-designed components
according to a generic architecture. Complexity is also reduced
by raising the abstraction level of the initial design phase.
Abstractions and the interconnect become crucial. With the
increase of the number of interconnected cores, buses no
longer oﬀer an adequate solution. On-chip complex networks
are required [3], [4]. As for processing elements, the formal
guarantee of their correct behavior will become mandatory.
NoCs are complex parametric designs making their formal
analysis challenging. Regarding the communication infrastruc-
ture, Schmaltz et al. [5], [6] propose GeNoC as an eﬃcient
specification environment for abstract and parametric NoC
designs. GeNoC provides (1) a network model to specify the
main characteristics of the NoC (e.g., topology, routing); (2)
an interpreter defining how the diﬀerent constituents interact;
(3) a correctness theorem for the interpreter; and (4) suﬃcient
constraints – or proof obligations – on the constituents from
which the proof of the correctness theorem follows. GeNoC
is generic in the sense that the constituents are not given
any specific definition but only characterized by their proof
obligations. Consequently, the validation of a particular NoC
reduces to (1) giving a concrete definition to the constituents
and (2) discharging the corresponding instantiated constraints.
GeNoC has been implemented in the logic of the ACL2
theorem proving system [7] and applied to several case-studies,
e.g., the HERMES [8] and Spidergon [6] designs. Instances
of GeNoC are executable. They can be simulated on concrete
data. The same model is used for simulation and validation.
The correctness theorem of GeNoC states that when mes-
sage m reaches destination node d message m was emitted
at a valid source node, was actually destined to node d, and
followed a valid path to d. This is rather weak as it trivially
holds if no message ever each a destination. Our original
contribution is the addition of two new theorems to GeNoC.
The first one ensures that the routing function is deadlock-
free. The second one proves that all messages injected in the
network eventually leave the network, i.e., liveness. To prove
the original GeNoC correctness theorem, one has to prove
that the routing function terminates and ends in the correct
destination. This only proves that computing one route for
one message is correct when there is no other message in
the network. Deadlock and evacuation are global properties
that depend on the interaction of several messages. Their
proof requires more than termination of one application of
the routing function. This addition is the main contribution
for this paper. Following the GeNoC approach, our theorems
are generic and we provide suﬃcient proof obligations as
well. We instantiate our theorems on a parametric 2D-mesh
inspired from the HERMES NoC. The result is an executable
specification of a deadlock-free and alive NoC. We estimate
the time to develop and validate such a specification to be less
than 1-man month.
In the next Section, we briefly introduce the HERMES NoC.
Section III sketches the GeNoC methodology. We present the
deadlock and evacuation theorems in Section IV. Sections V
and VI contains respectively the specification of the NoC and
the proof of the corresponding constraints. We discuss our
results in Section VII and related work in Section VIII. Finally,
Section IX concludes.
II. The HERMES NoC
HERMES [9] is based on a 2D mesh architecture (Fig. 1a).
Each node is made of an IP core and a switch. Each switch has
five bi-directional ports: East, West, North, South connecting to
the neighbor switches, and Local to the IP core.
The routing policy is based on a deterministic, minimal
algorithm: the XY routing algorithm. Packets are routed first
along the x-axis to the correct column, then along the y-axis
to the correct processing node. HERMES uses the wormhole
switching technique: messages are decomposed into smaller
units called flits. The header (worm’s head) flit contains
information needed for routing. The control flit determines the
number of data flits (worm’s body) that follow in a pipelined
fashion.
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Figure 2. Specification Method Overview
We assume an HERMES network of arbitrary size. A
processing node consists of ports and a central switch. There
are in- and out-ports for each cardinal direction, a local in-
port for injecting messages and a local out-port for removing
messages from the network (see Fig. 1b). Each port has an
arbitrary number of 1-flit buﬀers. We consider an initial list –
of arbitrary size – of messages that are immediately injected
in the network.
III. The GeNoC Methodology
A. Overview
Our method is illustrated in Fig. 2. At its center one finds
function GeNoC which is defined by three constituents: the
Injection method, the Routing function, and the Switching
policy. These three functions are generic. They are not given
an explicit definition but only characterized by a set of
constraints or proof obligations (PO).
GeNoC takes as input argument an initial configuration,
noted σ. The latter contains the list of messages to be sent on
the network (T), the current value of the network state (ST),
and the list of messages that have reached their destination (A).
Function GeNoC recursively applies the composition of the
three constituents to the initial configuration. The computation
stops either when all messages have reached their destination
or when the current configuration is in a deadlock. If the
current configuration is not in deadlock, the switching policy
must decrease the termination measure. This proves GeNoC
always terminates.
GeNoC is characterized by three global theorems. The
Correctness Theorem (CorrThm) states that messages reaching
a destination d were actually emitted at a source node s,
destined to d, and followed a valid path from s to d. The Dead-
lock Theorem (DeadThm) ensures that the routing function is
deadlock-free. The Evacuation Theorem (EvacThm) states that
all messages that have been injected in the network actually
arrive at their destination and leave the network.
The proof of these theorems depends on the proof oblig-
ations associated to the constituents. It does not depend on
their particular definition. Thus, these global theorems hold for
all instances of the constituents that satisfy the corresponding
instances of the proof obligations. This is central to the GeNoC
approach and induces the following methodology.
As shown in Fig. 2, the user input consists of giving a defini-
tion to functions I, R, and S and to discharge the corresponding
instances of the proof obligations. Once the proof obligations
have been discharged, it automatically follows that the con-
crete instance of GeNoC satisfies the corresponding instances
of the three global theorems. Thanks to the implementation of
GeNoC in the ACL2 theorem proving system [10], instances
of the constraints and of GeNoC are automatically generated.
Moreover, the logic of ACL2 being executable, instances of
GeNoC can eﬃciently be simulated on concrete data. In brief,
from validated components a user automatically obtains a
proven correct and executable specification.
B. GeNoC and its constituents
A travel t is a data structure which stores the progress of
sending a message across a network. It is a triple < id, c, d >
where id is a unique identifier for the travel, c denotes the
current location of the message, and d is the destination port.
T denotes the list of travels that is sent across the network.
To keep the list of travels well-formed, destinations have
to be reachable from their source. To this end, function
s R d returns true if s is reachable from d. This function
is application dependent and must be instantiated. It is quite
technical and not essential. We will therefore not detail it any
further.
A state ST is a data structure which stores the current
network state. The state is defined as the list of all the ports of
the network. Each port is associated to the list of its buﬀers.
A configuration σ is a tuple <T, ST, A>, where T is a list of
travels that are sent across the network, ST is a network state
and A is a list of arrived travels. The travels T of configuration
σ are denoted by σ.T . The set of all configurations is denoted
by Σ.
Function I : Σ → Σ represents the injection method. Given
a configuration, it decides which travels from T are ready for
departure and injects these into the network.
Function R : P × P → P represents the routing function
of a switch. From the current position and the destination it
computes the next hop. We generalize this function to apply
to a configuration and to compute all hops from source to
destination. We then write R : Σ → Σ. It computes for
each travel in σ.T the route from its current location to the
destination.
Function S : Σ → Σ represents the switching policy. It
takes as parameter the current configuration and computes the
configuration after one switching step, i.e., after each message
that can make progression has advanced by at most one hop.
If a message arrives at its destination, the corresponding travel
is removed from T and added to A.
A deadlock-configuration is a configuration σ in which
there exists no message that can make progression. This is
denoted by Ω(σ). An interconnection network is deadlock-free
if and only if there exists no deadlock-configuration.
Function GeNoC is defined as follows:
GeNoC(σ) def=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
σ iﬀ σ.T = ∅
σ iﬀ Ω(R(I(σ)))
GeNoC(S(R(I(σ)))) iﬀ otherwise
IV. Deadlock and Evacuation
A. Constraints for deadlock-free routing
Dally and Seitz [11] proposed a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for deadlock-free routing. They prove that a routing
function is deadlock-free if and only if it has no cycle in
its channel dependency graph. We have formalized a slightly
diﬀerent condition in GeNoC. Dally and Seitz define their
function at the level of processing nodes. We define our routing
function at the level of ports. We briefly present our condition
and a set of constraints which are suﬃcient to discharge it.
Details on our formalization and its relation to Dally and
Seitz’ condition are available elsewhere [12]. To prove ne-
cessity, we construct a cycle from a deadlock configuration.
We prove that a deadlock implies a set P of ports, which
contains the next hop of each message in each port in P.
The witness for P is the set of unavailable ports in the
deadlock configuration. Correctness of the witness is proven
by contradiction: for any message in an unavailable port, the
next hop must be unavailable as well, since otherwise the
message can move which contradicts the deadlock. From P
we construct a graph, with P as vertices and the connected
pairs of ports in P as edges. In this graph each vertex has at
least one neighbor, and we prove that any such graph contains
at least one cycle. Constraint (C-1), see below, ensures that
the graph is a subgraph of the dependency graph. Thus the
dependency graph contains a cycle.
To prove suﬃciency, we construct a deadlock configuration
from a cycle. Let (p0, p1) by a pair in the cycle. By constraint
(C-2), see below, there exists a destination for messages in p0
such that p1 is the next hop. Each port of the cycle is filled
with messages with these destinations. Since each message
can have at most one next hop (determinism), all next hops
of all messages are ports in the cycle. Since all ports in the
cycle are filled and thus unavailable, the configuration is in
deadlock.
Let R : P × P → P be a routing function. The port
dependency graph is a graph with as vertices the ports of
the interconnection network and as edges the pairs of ports
connected by the routing function.
Theorem 1: R is deadlock-free if and only there is no cycle
in its port dependency graph.
The proof of this necessary and suﬃcient condition is
structured in such a way that it only depends on a fixed set of
constraints over the dependency graph, the routing function,
and the definition of reachable destination. Let ER
dep
represent
the edges of the port dependency graph. These constraints are
the following:
∀s, d∀p ∈ R(s, d) · s R d =⇒ (s, p) ∈ ERdep (C-1)
∀(po, p1) ∈ ERdep∃d · p0 R d ∧ p1 ∈ R(p0, d) (C-2)
∀P′ ⊆ P · ¬ cycledep(P′) (C-3)
Constraint (C-1) states that each pair of ports connected by R
must be an edge. We consider pairs resulting from reachable
destinations only. Constraint (C-2) states that for each edge
(p0, p1) a reachable destination port must exist such that R
routes from p0 to p1. Constraint (C-3) states that there is no
cycle in the port dependency graph.
B. Constraints for evacuation
All messages evacuate the network if, when GeNoC termin-
ates, the list of arrived messages equals the list of messages
that were sent. This defines the Evacuation Theorem as fol-
lows:
Theorem 2: All messages eventually leave the network.
Formally, we have GeNoC(σ).A = σ.T .
We assume all messages have been injected in the initial
configuration. The injection method does not inject any more
messages:
I(σ) = σ (C-4)
Assuming Constraints (C-1) through (C-3) are satisfied,
GeNoC terminates if and only if all messages have evacuated
the network. Hence, proving evacuation reduces to proving ter-
mination of function GeNoC. To prove termination, we define
a termination measure, i.e., a value which decreases after each
recursive call. Proving evacuation reduces to instantiating a
function μ(σ), which computes a termination measure such
that the following constraint holds:
σ.T  ∅ ∧ ¬Ω(σ) =⇒ μ(S(R(σ))) < μ(σ) (C-5)
As long as there are messages in the network and there is no
deadlock, the measure provided by μ must decrease with each
switching step.
V. User Input, Part I: Executable Specification
1) Notation: A tuple <x, y, P, D> represents a port p, where
x and y represent the address of the processing node of p, P
is the name of p (either E, W, S, N or L) and D is the direction
(either IN or OUT). Function dir(p) returns the direction of
port p. Function port(p) returns the port name. Functions x(p)
and y(p) return respectively the x- and y-coordinate of port p.
Function trans(p, PD) returns the port specified by PD in the
same processing node as p:
trans(p, PD) def= <x(p), y(p), P, D>
Function next in(p) returns the in-port connected to p, e.g.,
next in(<0, 0, E, OUT>) = <1, 0, W, IN>.
2) Injection Method: As we assume that all messages are
injected at time 0, the injection method is the identity function,
noted Iid .
3) Routing Function: At each port, function Rxy is defined
as follows:
Rxy(p, d) def=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
next in(p) iﬀ dir(p) = OUT
trans(p, WO) iﬀ x(d) < x(p)
trans(p, EO) iﬀ x(d) > x(p)
trans(p, NO) iﬀ y(d) < y(p)
trans(p, SO) iﬀ y(d) > y(p)
trans(p, LO) iﬀ otherwise
4) Switching Policy: We re-use the specification of the
wormhole switching policy described in Borrione et al. [8].
Let Swh be that function. A port accepts a flit if it has at least
one available buﬀer. Note that a port can only accept flits
of at most one packet. For each message of a configuration,
function Swh moves or not the message depending on the state
of the handshake protocol and available buﬀer spaces at the
next hop.
5) Global Function: Function GeNoC2D is the instantiation
of function GeNoC. Since injection is immediate, function Iid
can be removed from the recursive call. Furthermore, since xy-
routing is deterministic, the routes can be pre-computed. That
is, for any configurations σ and σ′, we have Rxy(σ) = Rxy(σ′).
Therefore, function Rxy(σ) can be removed from the recursive
call as well. We extend travels to store a route as well. The
route of travel t is denoted t.r. Given a configuration σ where
all messages have been injected and routes have been pre-
computed, function GeNoC2D is defined as follows:
GeNoC2D(σ) def=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
σ iﬀ σ.T = ∅
σ iﬀ Ω(σ)
GeNoC2D(Swh(σ)) iﬀ otherwise
6) Dependency graph: Function next outs(p) returns the
set of out-ports connected to an in-port. It is defined as:
next outs(p) def=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
trans(p, LO)
trans(p, WO) iﬀ port(p) ∈ {E, L}
trans(p, EO) iﬀ port(p) ∈ {W, L}
trans(p, NO) iﬀ port(p)  N
trans(p, SO) iﬀ port(p)  S
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
Function Exydep is defined as follows:
Exy
dep
(p) def=
{
next outs(p) iﬀ dir(p) = IN
{next in(p)} iﬀ dir(p) = OUT
It connects each out-port to the next in-port, and each in-port
to the set of next out-ports (see Fig. 3).
VI. User Input, Part II: Proofs
A. Deadlock
Our objective is to prove that Theorem 1 holds for our
instance of the HERMES NoC, i.e., xy-routing in an arbitrary
large 2D-mesh. Following our methodology, it is enough to
discharge constraints (C-1) to (C-3).
Proof of (C-1)xy. Proof obligation (C-1) states that for any
dependency introduced by the routing function there is an edge
Figure 3. Port dependency graph of a 2×2-Mesh
Figure 4. Northern and Western flows
in the dependency graph. The proof proceeds by a systematic
case-analysis on the possible outputs of function Rxy. For each
case, the proof is rather easy as by definition any output is a
neighbour and any pair of neighbours forms an edge in Edep.
Proof of (C-2)xy. This constraint states the opposite
direction: any edge of the dependency graph corresponds to
a possible move of the routing algorithm. We define function
find dest(p) to return the nearest destination port reachable
from p:
find dest(p) def=
{
trans(p, LO) iﬀ dir(p) = IN
trans(next in(p), LO) iﬀ dir(p) = OUT
Given a pair (p0, p1), we compute the nearest destination
port d to p1 and prove that p1 ∈ Rxy(p0, d).
Proof of (C-3)xy. This is the main eﬀort as we have to
prove that there is no cycle in the dependency graph which
is of arbitrary size. The proof proceeds by contradiction. We
assume that there is a cycle. Then, we use the concept of
flows. A flow is a sequence of ports which continually in- or
decreases a coordinate. A flow is a contradiction with a cycle.
There are four possible flows: one for each cardinal direction.
We show that after at most one hop a flow is encountered
from which there is no escape. After at most one hop it is
impossible to return to the current port. Contradiction.
As example, see Fig. 4. The Northern-flow consists solely of
South-In and North-Out ports. This flow continually decreases
the y-coordinate. The only way to escape a Northern-flow is
by entering a local out-port, which would violate the cycle
assumption. As another example, the Western-flow consists
solely of West-Out and East-In ports, continually increasing
the x-coordinate. There are two ways to escape a Western-flow:
either a local out-port, or a vertical flow. The first violates the
cycle assumption, and the second has already been shown not
to have an escape.
All proof obligations associated to Theorem 1 for xy-routing
File Lines Thms Fns CPU Hmn
Rxy 1173 97 42 16 4
Iid, (C-4) 47 4 2 1 0
Swh, (C-5) 1434 151 25 17 6
(C-1)xy 483 40 7 17 2
(C-2)xy 435 51 0 51 2
(C-3)xy 1018 81 10 28 4
Generic Defs 3127 234 85 2 N/A
CorrThm 2267 65 11 6 N/A
Dead/EvacThm 3277 285 125 6 N/A
Overall 13261 1008 307 144 20
Table I
Overview of verification effort
have been discharged. Our instance of HERMES is deadlock-
free.
B. Evacuation
Our objective is to prove that all messages injected in
the network reach their destination, i.e., any list of pending
messages can evacuate the network. As stated in Theorem 2,
to prove evacuation it is enough to prove that GeNoC termin-
ates. Following our methodology, it is suﬃcient to discharge
constraint (C-5) for HERMES.
We need to define a termination measure and prove that it
is decreased after each application of the switching policy. We
define termination measure μxy to be the sum of the lengths
of the routes of all messages of the configuration:
μxy(σ) =
∑
{|m.r| | m ∈ σ.T }
The current configuration is deadlock-free and at least one
header flit can make progress. Therefore, wormhole switching
(function Swh) decrements its route by 1, reducing the measure
by 1 as well. Constraint (C-5)wh is satisfied which proves
liveness of our instance of HERMES.
VII. Results
Table I gives an overview of the specification and proof
eﬀort. We used the ACL2 ”Sedan” [13], an Eclipse interface
to the ACL2 theorem prover [10].
Column “CPU” gives the computation time to replay the
definitions and the proofs on a standard laptop1. Numbers are
counted in minutes. Column “Hmn” gives an estimate on the
interaction required to perform the proof, counted in days. We
assume an experienced ACL2 user familiar with the HERMES
network and the GeNoC approach.
Only the upper part of table I is instantiation-specific. The
generic definitions and proofs have been done once and for
all and do not require any more human eﬀort.
The table shows that discharging Constraints (C-1) and (C-
2) takes relatively little human interaction but a long CPU
time. This is because these proofs basically consist of many
case distinctions. For these constraints, ACL2 provided a high
degree of automation. Constraint (C-3) takes the most human
interaction. We have proven this constraint for 2D-Meshes of
12.1 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo, MacOS X, 2 GB RAM
arbitrary size. However, by instantiating the dependency graph
for a fixed size network, a simple search for a cycle suﬃces.
This search can be performed in linear time [14].
Constraint (C-5) has been proven nearly genericly, i.e., for
any routing algorithm that is not both adaptive and non-
minimal.
VIII. Related work
Several specific NoC architectures have been studied using
model-checking [15], theorem proving [16] or combinations
thereof [17] . Regarding formal proofs of deadlock prevention,
Gebremichael et al. [16] formally prove a suﬃcient condition
for the Æthereal protocol of Philips in a packet-switched
network. The main property that has been verified is the
absence of deadlock for an arbitrary number of masters and
slaves. These works target very specific design described at a
low level of abstraction. Our method supports the specification
of a large class of systems described at a higher-level of
abstraction. More recently, Taktak et al. [18] defined an al-
gorithm checking a condition suﬃcient for deadlock-freedom
for adaptive routing in NoCs. This work focuses on deadlock
detection and first extracts the strongly connected components
of the dependency graph. Then, it looks for cycles between
these components. This approach could be used to discharge
constraint (C-3) for fixed instances.
IX. Conclusion
We presented a specification and validation methodology
for high-level and parametric descriptions of NoC designs.
Our method includes the proof that the network is deadlock-
free and can evacuate all injected messages. The proof is fully
parametric: the number of messages, their size, the number of
buﬀers at each node are left uninterpreted. Thanks to the use
of the ACL2 theorem prover, our models are also executable.
The same models are used for both formal validation and
simulation.
Our method currently applies to deterministic routing al-
gorithms. This restriction is due to our deadlock condition. We
plan to formalize such a condition for adaptive routing [19],
[20], [21]. The main tasks will be to define a diﬀerent depend-
ency graph and formally check the condition. The rest of the
method would not be aﬀected. Another restriction of our cur-
rent model is that all messages must be injected immediately.
Regarding evacuation, Theorem 2 could be rephrased such that
it proves that all injected messages reach a destination, i.e.,
all injected messages eventually leave the network. We are
working on the proof that all messages are eventually injected.
This proof entails a generic bound on the injection time of
each message. This injection time is not only dependent on
the injection method, but also on the state of the network,
e.g., the latency and the number of injection buﬀers. Deadlock-
freedom is necessary, since otherwise there is no guarantee that
an unavailable injection buﬀer eventually becomes available.
The GeNoC model used in this paper is at the specification
level. Recently, van den Broek and Schmaltz [22] defined two
variations (implementation and specification) of the GeNoC
model and formally proved them equivalent. We plan to
integrate our deadlock and evacuation theorems to these new
models and their relation contributing to a general cross-layer
verification method for NoCs.
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